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Normativism and Doxastic Deliberation 
Conor McHugh 
 
When we deliberate about what to believe, considerations relevant to what is  true play a 
special role in motivating us to believe or not believe one thing or another. This special role 
should be understood, according to Nishi Shah, in terms of the phenomenon of transparency. 
Shah takes transparency as the base of an inference to the best explanation, whose conclusion 
is a normativist account of (the concept of) belief. In this paper I distinguish the alleged 
phenomenon  of  transparency  from  a  range  of  other  possible  phenomena  that  might 
characterise truth's role in doxastic deliberation. I do not address the question which of these 
phenomena are genuine and which spurious. Rather, I argue that normativism does not explain 
transparency (if genuine), and furthermore that it explains at most a relatively weak claim 
about rational doxastic deliberation. Since this claim can also be explained in other ways, 
including by rival accounts of belief, doxastic deliberation gives no support for normativism. 
 
1. Doxastic Deliberation 
Doxastic  deliberation  is  deliberation  framed  by  the  question  what  to  believe  about  some 
subject matter (e.g. whether to believe p) and that aims to conclude in the formation of a 
belief about that subject matter (e.g. the belief that p or the belief that ~p).
1 Although doxastic 
deliberation is deliberation about what to bel ieve, it involves a special role for a seemingly 
different  question,  namely  what  is  true  (e.g.  whether  p  is  true;  or  simply  whether  p). 
Normally, the considerations  on the basis of which a doxastic attitude is  formed through 
deliberation are considerations seen as relevant to what is true with respect to the subject 
matter  addressed  (e.g.  evidence  about  whether  p).  Truth  thus  has  a  special  role  in  the 
                                                 
1   Doxastic deliberation can also conclude in withholding belief (suspension of judgment) about the relevant 
subject matter. This is an unsuccessful outcome, in so far as doxastic deliberation involves the aim to make 
up one’s mind. 2 
deliberative motivation of belief.
2 
Nishi  Shah  characterises  this  special  role  of  truth  in  doxastic  deliber ation  in  terms  of 
transparency, which he describes thus: 
 
“when  asking  oneself  whether  to  believe  that  p,  [one]  must  ...  immediately 
recognize that this question is settled by the answer to the question whether p is 
true[.] ... Within the perspective of first-personal doxastic deliberation, that is, 
deliberation  about  what  to  believe,  one  cannot  separate  the  two  questions.” 
(Shah 2003, 447) 
 
Transparency is thus a relation between two questions. Question A is transparent to question B 
when a subject can and must answer question A simply by answering question B, and when 
the subject must immediately recognise this on asking herself question A. Shah's claim is that 
the  question  whether  to  believe  p  is,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  deliberating  subject, 
transparent to the question whether p is true (see also Shah and Velleman 2005, 499). 
For Shah, truth thus excludes all other considerations from doxastic deliberation, and does so 
immediately. It is not that, when engaging in deliberation about what to believe, you reason 
that  pragmatic  (non-truth-directed)  considerations  are  irrelevant,  or  motivationally 
inefficacious, and so you intentionally ignore them. Rather, on asking the question whether to 
believe  p,  your  attention  immediately  focuses  exclusively  on  evidence  (truth-directed 
                                                 
2  By using the term ‘deliberative motivation’ I do not intend to suggest that beliefs are formed voluntarily. 
Rather, I refer to cases in which there are reasons for which one believes, where these reasons are or can be 
taken up in consciousness and their probative force as reasons for belief explicitly or implicitly recognised, 
and where one believes directly on the basis of these reasons. 
Motivation in this sense, while not necessarily involving voluntary control, is not mere causation either. 
Pragmatic considerations certainly can causally influence belief (as Shah is careful to point out), but this does 
not mean that they can be reasons for which one believes. The claims I discuss will all concern the kinds of 
considerations that can play the role of reasons for which one believes in the  deliberative motivation of 
belief. On the relations between motivation, control and voluntariness, see McHugh (2011a, 2012a). 
Note also that I am exclusively concerned with reasons for which one forms a particular belief—such as the 
belief that p—and not with reasons for which one goes about forming a belief about a particular subject-
matter. 3 
considerations)  (Shah  loc  cit.).  Considerations  to  do  with  whether  it  would  be  pleasant, 
advantageous or amusing to believe  p, independent of whether p is true, do not occur in 
deliberation as bearing on whether to believe p. In this sense, transparency is supposed to be a 
feature of the “phenomenology of deliberation” (ibid., 462)—of what it's subjectively like to 
deliberatively ask yourself whether to believe p. The claim is that it is subjectively equivalent 
to asking yourself whether p. 
So: 
 
Transparency:  Pragmatic  considerations  cannot  occur  to  a  thinker,  within  doxastic 
deliberation, as relevant to what to believe.
3 
 
One might find the claim that doxastic deliberation is characterised by transparency too 
strong.
4 Is it really an invariable feature of the phenomenology of doxastic deliberation that 
the thinker who asks herself whether to believe  p cannot so much as be struck by pragmatic 
considerations as relevant to that question? One might wish instead to make the more modest 
claim that only (what the thinker sees as) evidence can deliberatively motivate the thinker 
within doxastic deliberation.
5 Even if considerations of what is pleasant, advantageous or 
                                                 
3   What kind of impossibility is expressed by "cannot" in this formulation? For the purposes of the paper we 
can  understand  it  as  psychological  impossibility,  rather  than  something  stronger  like  metaphysical  or 
conceptual impossibility. There are two reasons for this. 
First, transparency is supposed to be a datum, but, even if obviously true (which I doubt), it is certainly not 
obviously a metaphysical or conceptual truth. Anything stronger than a claim of psychological impossibility 
would have to be supported by philosophical theorising. 
Second, since my target is the explanatory power of normativism, it is charitable to make the explanandum 
relatively weak. 
For the rest of this paper, claims about what thinkers can or cannot do may be understood as expressing only 
psychological possibility or impossibility, unless otherwise indicated. 
4  Shah's characterisations of transparency are not all equivalent. At times he seems to mean the putative feature 
I described; at others he seems to mean something weaker —what I will call strong exclusivity (e.g. Shah 
2003: 453). I will reserve the term 'transparency' for the stronger feature. 
  Shah and Velleman (2005: 517-8) distinguish between deliberation about whether to “accord” a “pre-existing 
acceptance” that p the status of a belief, and deliberation about whether tout court to believe p. Transparency, 
they claim, is a feature of the latter sort of deliberation only. I restrict my attention to this. 
5  By ‘deliberatively motivate’ I mean function within deliberation as reasons for which  one (say) forms a 
belief, or as considerations that provide some motivation to (say) form a belief even if one does not actually 4 
amusing to believe can occur within doxastic deliberation as relevant to whether to believe p, 
one might say, such considerations cannot move the thinker, in the guise of reasons, through 
doxastic deliberation. The thinker's doxastic state will be unaffected by them. Truth excludes 
all other considerations from doxastic deliberation, not phenomenologically, but at the point 
of motivational efficacy. 
This putative feature of doxastic deliberation is exclusivity.
6 It comes in stronger or weaker 
versions.
7 The difference between the strong and weak versions reflects the fact that there are 
two ways in which doxastic  deliberation can conclude: it can conclude in the forming of a 
belief, or it can conclude in the forming of a state of withholding belief (aka suspension of 
judgment). Thus, it might be claimed that  pragmatic considerations cannot be motivationally 
efficacious at all in doxastic deliberation,  either in providing motivation to believe or in 
providing  motivation  to  withhold  belief .  Or,  it  might  be  claimed  only  that  pragmatic 
considerations cannot provide deliberative motivation to believe, even if they can sometimes 
provide such motivation to withhold belief.
8 
 
Strong  exclusivity:  Pragmatic  considerations  cannot  deliberatively  motivate  belief  or 
withholding of belief. 
 
Weak exclusivity: Pragmatic considerations cannot deliberatively motivate belief.
9 
                                                                                                                                                         
form it. See n.2 above. 
  There may be an argument that if considerations of a certain kind cannot deliberatively motivate you to do 
something, then they are not normative reasons for you to do that thing (see Shah 2006). But this would not 
amount to transparency, which has to do with what the deliberating subject can see as reasons that count in 
favour of or against believing. In any case the point won’t matter for my argument. 
6  I take this label from Steglich-Petersen (2009). 
7  I discuss this difference in McHugh (forthcoming a) 
8   In what follows I will sometimes talk about considerations ‘deliberatively motivating’ or just ‘motivating’ 
belief, or withholding. This is meant to include cases where a consideration provides some motivational 
‘push’, through deliberation, to believe (say), even if you do not in fact form the belief (e.g. because there are 
other considerations pushing you the opposite way). 
9  The claim of weak exclusivity enjoys wide endorsement —for example from Bennett (1991), Walker (1996, 
2001), Owens (2000, 2003), Kelly (2002) and Hieronymi (2008)—but is not often distinguished from strong 
exclusivity. I argue against both strong and weak exclusivity in McHugh (forthcoming a), as does Frankish 5 
 
The claim here is that pragmatic considerations are wholly excluded from the deliberative 
motivation of belief (or of withholding, in the case of strong exclusivity). One might prefer to 
make  a  yet  more  modest  claim.  One  might  think  that  truth  must  play  some  significant 
motivating role in doxastic deliberation,
10 even if other considerations can also play some 
role. For example, if offered a tremendous reward to believe a proposition that, by your lights, 
your evidence counts against, or for which your evidence is evenly balanced, you cannot 
nonetheless come to believe the proposition, for the reason that you will thereby win the 
reward, through the process of deliberation about whether to believe it. But even if a certain 
degree of evidential support is always necessary in the deliberative motivation of belief, it 
might be that, given the presence of that evidential support, pragmatic considerations, such as 
the prospect of a reward, can add some extra deliberative motivation, pushing the thinker to 
go ahead and form the belief.
11 
What degree of evidential support might be required for the deliberative motivation of belief? 
Various answers might be proposed. For the purposes of this paper, we can consider the claim 
that the evidence must at least make the content of the belief more likely to be true than not, 
in the thinker's eyes.
12 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
(2007). If strong exclusivity is an illusion, then so too is transparency, since the latter is stronger. For the 
purposes of this paper I do not question transparency or exclusivity, strong or weak. (See also Zalabardo 
2010 for some doubts about transparency.) This paper and my argument in my (forthcoming a) constitute two 
independent attacks on the motivation for normativism. 
10  When deliberation is motivationally efficacious at all. Perhaps it is sometimes not so. You can believe against 
your own assessment of the evidence. In such cases, truth arguably fails to play a significant motivating role. 
But  such  beliefs  are   formed  and  maintained   not  through  doxastic  deliberation,  but  through  other 
psychological mechanisms—or so the claim would go. 
11  See McHugh (forthcoming a). 
12  Elsewhere (McHugh 2011b, forthcoming a) I have argued that there is indeed a phenomenon of efficacy, that 
the required degree of evidential support is much more than merely making the content of the belief more 
likely than not to be true, and that the required degree is in fact su ch as would be good enough for 
knowledge. I have suggested that this should be understood modally: the thinker would not easily have that 
evidence and yet the content be false. Similar views can be found in Owens (2000) and Adler (2002). These 
views are controversial, and it is more charitable in the present context to stick with the  weaker claim of 
efficacy I have outlined. 6 
Efficacy:  A  thinker  cannot  form  a  belief  through  deliberation  on  the  basis  of  pragmatic 
considerations, unless there is also evidential support that, in the subject's eyes, makes the 
content of the belief more likely than not to be true. 
 
I have described four possible ways of characterising the role of truth in doxastic deliberation, 
in descending order of strength: transparency, strong exclusivity, weak exclusivity, efficacy. 
My  question  is  not  which  of  these  phenomena  (if  any)  are  genuine  and  which  (if  any) 
spurious, but rather what the explanation for these phenomena, if genuine, might be. The 
significance of this question lies in Shah's argument for his normativist account of belief, to 
which I now turn. 
 
2. Normativism 
Shah states his account of belief as follows: 
 
“the idea that truth is the standard of correctness for belief ... is expressed in the 
prescription to believe that p only if p is true... . My hypothesis is that accepting 
this prescription is one of the conditions for possessing the concept of belief.” 
(2003, 448-9) 
 
According to this account, it is a conceptual truth about belief that a belief is correct if its 
propositional content is true, and incorrect if its propositional content is false. This standard of 
correctness is understood as normative. In particular, it is understood as a prescription: for any 
p the standard of correctness for belief demands or requires that you believe p only if p. Thus, 
the concept of belief is a normative concept: to grasp the concept of belief is to accept for any 7 
p to which you apply the concept that you ought to believe p only if p,
13 in the sense that you 
apply to yourself and others the prescription to satisfy this standard.  
There are various points at which one might disagree with this account. One might agree that 
truth is the norm of belief, but deny that this norm is prescriptive, holding that it is instead, for 
example, evaluative.
14 One might hold that (the concept of) belief is not normative, but rather 
teleological: it is (the concept of) a state that has as its aim or function to be true, thus making 
truth not a norm but an a im or telos.
15 One might hold a more deflationary view, on which 
there is a standard of correctness for belief, but this standard, like the standard of correctness 
for sudoku puzzles, has no implications for what anyone aims to do or ought to do.
16 Or, one 
might even deny that truth is in any sense a  unique  ‘proper’  standard  of  correctness  for 
belief.
17 
Why, then, should we accept normativism? Shah takes transparency as a datum, and his 
argument is an inference to the best explanation from this. Let's see then  how normativism 
purports to explain transparency, assuming the latter is indeed a genuine feature of doxastic 
deliberation. Note that if it can explain transparency then it can also explain strong and weak 
exclusivity, and efficacity, since they all follow from transparency.  
To deliberate about whether to believe  p is to engage in deliberation that is framed by the 
question whether to believe p. Doxastic deliberation thus involves exercise of the concept of 
belief, Shah claims.
18 Since the deliberating subject's grasp of the concept of belief involves 
                                                 
13  This ought has wide scope. You ought to: believe p only if p. 
14  See McHugh (2012b). 
15  Velleman (2000), Steglich-Petersen (2009), McHugh (2011b, forthcoming a, forthcoming b). This view can 
be developed as a version of the evaluative view, in so far as something’s fulfilling its function qua K makes 
it a good K (McHugh 2012b). Shah's overall account involves teleological elements, but the normativist 
element is independent, and I focus on this. 
16  Papineau (1999). See Rosen (2001) and Hattiangadi (2007) for the point that correctness need not be 
normative. 
17  This view is considered by Zalabardo (2010). 
18  One might wonder in what sense doxastic deliberation need involve exercise of the concept of belief. Shah is 
clear that doxastic deliberation need not involve the thinker's explicitly posing to herself the question whether 
to believe p. But the question must be “in the background”, directing the thinker's deliberation (Shah, loc. 
cit., 467). Deliberation “whose sole question is whether p is true” (ibid.)—what Zalabardo (loc. cit.) calls 
inquiry  into  whether  p—does  not  count  as  doxastic  deliberation.  Shah  is  committed  to  this  distinction 8 
acceptance of the prescription to believe p only if p, the exercise of the concept activates a 
disposition to try to satisfy this norm, to the exclusion of competing norms. Only evidence is 
relevant to how one can satisfy this norm. Thus, the concept of belief and the very nature of 
deliberation together ensure that in doxastic deliberation the subject is disposed to have an eye 
only for evidence. As Shah puts it: 
 
“a competent user of the concept of belief must accept the prescription to believe 
that p only if p is true for any activity that he conceives of as belief-formation. 
Because  one  accepts  this  prescription  insofar  as  one  is  deliberating  about 
whether to believe that p, determining whether p is true will be immediately 
imperative, to the exclusion of any other question, for anyone who entertains the 
deliberative question whether to believe that p.” (470) 
 
In the next section I will ask whether this explanation succeeds. 
 
3. What Can Normativism Explain? 
I will argue that the above explanation of transparency fails. I will do this by arguing that 
normativism cannot explain strong or weak exclusivity, from which it follows that it cannot 
explain transparency (since transparency includes both forms of exclusivity). I will argue that 
normativism can at best explain efficacy, and even then only if the latter is understood only as 
a constraint on rational doxastic deliberation. Since such a constraint can easily be explained 
in other ways, doxastic deliberation provides no support for normativism. 
                                                                                                                                                         
between doxastic deliberation and inquiry, since inquiry into whether p surely need not involve any exercise 
of the concept of belief. Equally, in the case of inquiry there is no transparency of the question whether to 
believe p to some other question; the thinker simply begins by asking whether p (is true), rather than asking a 
question about what to believe. As Zalabardo (loc. cit., 10) points out, once we recognise the distinction 
between inquiry and doxastic deliberation, the 'datum' of transparency becomes less compelling: perhaps we 
confuse the simple fact that we almost always ask ourselves, simply, whether p, and very rarely whether to 
believe p, with the transparency of the latter question to the former. (Thanks to Daniel Whiting for discussion 
here.) 9 
 
3.1 Exclusivity and Transparency 
I start with exclusivity. Shah says that the deliberating subject accepts a prescriptive norm 
enjoining  her  to  believe  p only  if  p,  and  that  acceptance  of  this  norm  is  what  explains 
transparency, and hence exclusivity. The explanation thus appeals to the subject's acceptance 
of  a  norm  in  order  to  explain  the  subject's  being  motivated to  satisfy  that  norm  to  the 
exclusion of any other consideration. It thus seems to assume that accepting a prescriptive 
norm guarantees that you will be motivated exclusively by considerations relevant to how to 
satisfy that norm.
19 On the face of it, however, this isn't so. There is a difference between 
accepting that, in doing something, you ought to satisfy   a certain condition, and being 
motivated exclusively by considerations relevant to that condition.
20 So Shah's explanation 
seems to involve a non-sequitur. 
To  avoid  this,  the  normativist  would  have  to  invoke  a  principle  to  justify  the  step  from 
attributing  acceptance  of  a  certain  norm  to  attributing  motivation  by  that  norm  to  the 
exclusion of other considerations. This would, it seems, be a form of motivational internalism. 
'Motivational  internalism'  is  an  umbrella  term  for  a  cluster  of  views  according  to  which, 
roughly, acceptances of norms are necessarily motivating.
21 Roughly, the idea is: necessarily 
if a subject accepts some norm governing her conduct (e.g. she judges that she ought to satisfy 
                                                 
19  It might be objected: Shah need not assume that this is generally true, but only that it is true with respect to 
the particular case of the norm of belief. That's correct, but as far as I can see Shah offers no explanation of 
why this particular instance of the claim, as opposed to any other, should be true, nor any reason to think that 
it is indeed so. The most promising way to find an explanation or justification for the particular claim is 
surely to look for a more general truth of which it is an instance—a general truth about norms of the relevant 
sort. I will be arguing that there is no such general truth. This not only leaves us with no justification for the 
particular claim; it also gives us reason to think it is false, in so far as the putative norm of belief should 
ceteris paribus behave like other, similar norms. Thus, if Shah's explanation of exclusivity rests on assuming 
that the particular claim is true, the explanation fails. 
20  Steglich-Petersen (2006, pp. 506ff.) makes this point, arguing that normativism cannot explain why we 
would be motivated (never mind  exclusively motivated) to satisfy the alleged norm of belief, nor why our 
concern for that norm would be 'immediate' (this corresponds to what I have called 'transparency'). Some of 
the points made in what follows can be found in Steglich-Petersen's paper, but his treatment is brief; his main 
interest lies in defending the teleological account of belief, rather than in critiquing the normativist account. 
21  Internalism comes in many varieties, as represented, for example, by Hare (1952), Smith (1994), Korsgaard 
(1996), McDowell (1998), Gibbard (2002) and Wedgwood (2007). 10 
condition C) then the subject will be motivated to satisfy that norm (e.g. she intends to do 
what she thinks would satisfy C). 
It might seem, then, that normativism could explain exclusivity (and perhaps transparency) 
when  combined  with  a  suitable  form  of  internalism.  The  problem,  however,  is  that  no 
defensible form of internalism can play this role. 
To  see  this,  consider  what  the  required  internalist  principles  would  be.  To  explain  weak 
exclusivity in terms of normativism we would need: 
 
  Int1:  If  S  accepts  a  norm  N  of  the  relevant  kind  for  act-type  Φ,  then  S  will  be 
  deliberatively motivated to Φ, if at all, only by N-directed considerations. 
 
To explain strong exclusivity we would need: 
 
  Int2:  If  S  accepts  a  norm  N  of  the  relevant  kind  for  act-type  Φ,  then  S  will  be 
  deliberatively motivated to Φ or to refrain from Φing, if at all, only by N-directed 
  considerations. 
 
Some clarifications: The 'relevant kind' of norm is the kind of which the putative norm of 
belief, the prescription to believe p only if p, is an instance. I use 'act-type' very broadly, to 
include  things  like  beliefs.  'N-directed  considerations'  means  considerations  that  S  sees 
(explicitly or otherwise) as bearing on how S can satisfy N. 
The  problem  is  that  Int1  and  Int2  are  false.  No  sensible  internalist  would  defend  them. 
Acceptance of a norm N for a certain domain of conduct just doesn't have the consequence 
that only N-directed considerations can deliberatively motivate conduct in the domain. In 
particular,  it  doesn't  have  this  consequence  when  N  is  of  a  certain  form—the  form  that, 11 
according to Shah, characterises the norm of belief. 
The norm of belief, Shah tells us, prescribes that you believe p only if p. This norm has the 
conditional form: 'Φ only if C obtains'. To accept a prescription of this form is to accept that 
you ought not: Φ when C does not obtain. Crucially, this leaves it open whether or not to Φ 
when C obtains; the prescription is silent on that. So, if you do Φ for any reason, then your 
reason for doing so, if any, cannot be a reason that is directed towards the satisfaction of the 
norm 'Φ only if  C  obtains'. The  fact  that  C obtains,  or evidence that  it obtains,  is  not  a 
consideration that in any way favours Φing, as far as that norm is concerned, but that doesn't 
mean you can't go ahead and Φ for some reason. Given that (as far as you are concerned) C 
obtains, you might be able to go ahead and Φ for any reason you like. 
For example, you accept a prescription for all Φ to Φ only if you would not thereby treat 
another person as a mere means to an end. Suppose for some Φ you are satisfied that by Φing 
you would not treat anyone as a mere means to an end. That still leaves open whether to Φ; 
after all, Φing might have nothing else positive to be said for it at all. If you go ahead and Φ, 
you might do so for any sort of reason at all—that it would be fun, or that it is a means to 
some important goal, or that it would help someone, or whatever. Indeed, if you don't have 
some such reason, then typically you won't go ahead and Φ, since you don't have any reason 
to.  
Applied to belief, the point is that evidence for p is not a consideration that favours believing 
p as far as the prescription to believe p only if p is concerned. All that the norm entails is that 
evidence against p favours not believing p (and disfavours believing p). 
We often believe for reasons, and our reasons for believing are usually evidential. (Of course 
Shah doesn't deny that; he sees it as part of his explanandum.) These reasons must derive from 
something other than concern for a norm that merely forbids false belief. If we do accept that 
norm, then this acceptance does not restrict our deliberative motivation to considerations that 12 
are directed towards the satisfaction of the norm—and nor should we expect it to,  given 
general considerations about norms of that form. 
Since  the  acceptance  of  a  norm  does  not  entail  any  such  restriction  on  our  deliberative 
motivation, then in particular acceptance of the norm of belief does not entail that we cannot 
be motivated in doxastic deliberation by pragmatic considerations. Int1 and Int2 are false, and 
normativism cannot explain either strong or weak exclusivity. 
It might be said that the solution to this problem is to reformulate the norm of belief. Rather 
than a prescription merely to believe p only if p, the norm should instead be understood as a 
prescription to believe p if and only if p.
22 A norm of the form 'Φ iff C obtains' does tell you 
what to do if C obtains—it tells you to Φ. So the fact that C obtains, or evidence that it 
obtains, will constitute a reason to Φ, as far as such a norm goes. 
In considering a norm of the merely conditional form, I follow Shah. It is no accident that 
Shah formulates the norm in this way. If the norm were a prescription, for any p, to believe p 
if and only if p, then it would enjoin you to believe any true proposition. It is not plausible 
that belief is governed by such a prescription; this would be implausibly demanding.
23 Nor is 
it plausible that grasp of the concept of belief involves acceptance of such an overdemandin g 
norm. We don't behave as though we accept such a norm. 
An alternative suggestion is that, even if the norm of belief merely forbids the holding of false 
and therefore incorrect beliefs, the activity of doxastic deliberation has as its constitutive aim 
that one arrive at a correct belief (and not merely that one avoid arriving at an incorrect one). 
                                                 
22   An alternative suggestion would be that the norm should be understood as a permission to (believe p) if and 
only if p (Whiting 2010). But this would not help: if condition C merely permits you to Φ, C’s obtaining still 
leaves it open whether to Φ, something that you would presumably settle by considering other reasons that 
favour or count against Φing (McHugh 2012b). 
23  See Bykvist and Hattiangadi (2007, forthcoming), Whiting (2010). In  McHugh (2012b) I consider in detail 
what the character of the truth norm of belief might be. There are candidate prescriptive norms of belief that 
do enjoin certain true beliefs, and are not obviously overdemanding. For example, one might propose 
something like: if you consider whether  p, or if you hold any doxastic attitude towards p, then you ought 
(believe p iff p) (see also Wedgwood, 2002). However, as I argue in that paper, there are other very serious 
problems facing the view that belief is governed by such a norm. Further formulations are considered and 
rejected by Bykvist and Hattiangadi (forthcoming). Space prevents me from discussing all these possibilities 
here. 13 
This might promise to explain why, in doxastic deliberation, we are motivated to believe 
propositions by evidence for those propositions, but not (typically) by pragmatic reasons for 
believing those propositions. 
In fact, Shah and Velleman seem to endorse something like this suggestion in the following 
passage: 
 
“A norm of correctness forbids the holding of beliefs that would be incorrect, but 
it merely permits the holding of correct beliefs. One is not required to hold every 
belief that would be correct. In deliberating whether to believe that p, however, 
one  is  committed  to  forming  the  belief  if  it  would  be  correct,  and  this 
commitment  tends  to  supply  the  injunctive  half  of  a  biconditional  norm, 
mandating a belief in p if and only if p is true.” (Shah and Velleman 2005: 519.) 
 
It's not clear what Shah and Velleman mean by 'commitment' in this passage, but it's hard to 
see how it could amount to anything other than an aim or intention. After all, as we have seen, 
it cannot be the acceptance of a norm, since we do not accept a norm enjoining us to believe 
truths. 
As far as I can see, Shah and Velleman don't offer anything to back up the claim that, in 
deliberating whether to believe p, you aim to form the belief if it would be correct.
24 But even 
if that claim is right, it does not entail exclusivity, strong or weak.
25 For you might have other 
aims too. You might also aim to arrive at a belief quickly, or entertainingl y, or to arrive at a 
                                                 
24  They claim that deliberation about whether to Φ is reasoning that is aimed at issuing or not issuing in a Φing, 
in accordance with norms for Φing (Shah and Velleman, loc. cit., p. 502). This strikes me as false. You can 
deliberate  about  whether  to  make  an  assertion  without  caring  about  the  norms  for  assertion.  You  can 
deliberate about whether to perform actions that are associated with no specific constitutive or proper norms. 
In any case, their claim about the nature of deliberation doesn't entail that, when deliberating about whether 
to Φ,  you are committed to  (Φ-ing if it is permissible to Φ), since doing everything  permissible  is  not 
necessary for adhering to the relevant norms. 
25  As pointed out (in slightly different terms) by Owens (2003), whose argument I follow here. A closely related 
point is in fact made by Shah himself (Shah,  loc. cit.). See McHugh (forthcoming a, forthcoming b) for 
discussion. 14 
belief that is not too disturbing. In deliberating over aim-directed behaviours, we typically 
take into account considerations bearing on the satisfaction of the various relevant aims we 
have, and opt for a course of action that we expect to give the best overall outcome with 
respect to those aims. So, the mere fact (if it is one) that you aim to form a correct belief  
should not prevent you from taking into account, and being motivated by, considerations that 
are not relevant to the truth of p. Compare: if you are deliberating about whether to guess that 
p, or whether to conjecture that p, you will aim to guess or conjecture correctly and not 
incorrectly.  But  you  might  also  be  motivated  by  other  considerations—speed,  whether  it 
would be more costly to incorrectly guess that p or to incorrectly guess that ~p, and so on. 
In any case, if Shah were to invoke an aim that is constitutive of doxastic deliberation in order 
to  explain  exclusivity  (weak  or  strong),  then  this  would  undermine  his  argument  for 
normativism. That argument claimed precisely that it is the norm of belief, and not some aim 
that is held by believers, that explains exclusivity (and transparency). If exclusivity is, after 
all, explained by an aim that is constitutive of doxastic deliberation, then the argument fails.
26 
Thus, normativism cannot explain exclusivity, weak or strong.  A fortiori, it cannot explain 
transparency. 
My claims here are in strong disagreement with the following remarks of Shah and Velleman, 
regarding their explanation of transparency: 
 
“This  explanation  relies  on  a  very  weak  form  of  internalism  about  normative 
thought. The relevant form of internalism does not require a positive disposition to 
obey any norm that one applies; what it requires is the lack of a disposition to 
obey a different norm instead. One cannot genuinely apply the norm of truth to an 
attitude  while  simultaneously  trying  only  to  make  it  conform  to  some  other, 
                                                 
26  Compare Steglich-Petersen (2006, p. 508). 15 
unrelated norm. This form of internalism does not rule out obedience to additional 
norms  compatible  with  the  one  applied.  One  can  aim  to  arrive  as  quickly  as 
possible at a true cognition with respect to p—in which case, one will deliberate in 
accordance with a norm of speed as well as the norm of truth. One can aim to 
arrive at a true cognition in a manner that,if it leads to error, is more likely to err 
in stopping short of true cognition than in arriving at a false one; one will then 
deliberate in accordance with norms of caution as well as truth. What one cannot 
do, according to our weak form of internalism, is to apply a norm in thought while 
hewing to a competing norm in practice.” (Shah and Velleman, loc. cit., n. 40.) 
 
I find this passage puzzling. I do not see how the weak form of internalism mentioned here 
could suffice for the normativist's purposes. Shah and Velleman distinguish between norms 
that are compatible with a norm that one 'applies', and norms that are incompatible with it. 
They say that if you apply a norm N then you will not follow (obey, try to satisfy) only norms 
incompatible with N. Maybe so. But this form of internalism, combined with normativism, 
entails at most that in doxastic deliberation you cannot be motivated only by considerations 
directed  towards  norms  incompatible  with  truth!  This  consequence  is  weaker  even  than 
efficacity. 
Exclusivity and transparency rule out any non-truth-directed consideration from playing the 
relevant roles in doxastic deliberation. They do not merely rule out considerations directed to 
incompatible norms. If you can be motivated by norms of speed and caution in doxastic 
deliberation, then why shouldn't this show up in the reasons that you can take into account 
and that can motivate you to believe or not to believe? Why shouldn't you believe things in 
part for speed- or caution-directed reasons? (For example, why can’t you deliberate like this: 
“Shall I believe p? Well, I don’t have much evidence for it, but I’d like to have a settled 16 
attitude about p as quickly as possible, so I’ll go ahead and believe it.” – and conclude by 
forming the belief?) The form of internalism envisaged by Shah and Velleman in the quoted 
passage does nothing to rule this out. 
On the other hand, if the normativist made the stronger claim that applying a norm N rules out 
following any other norm, compatible with N or not, then this would be implausible, as we 
have seen.
27 
I turn next to efficacy. The problems I raise for the normativist's explanation o f efficacy will 
also be further problems for his explanation of exclusivity and transparency, since the latter 
include efficacy.
28 
 
3.2 Efficacy 
As we saw, acceptance of a norm doesn't guarantee exclusive motivation by considerations 
relevant to that norm. But perhaps it guarantees some motivation by such considerations. It is 
a claim of this sort—more recognisably like a defensible kind of motivational internalism—
that the normativist requires in order to explain efficacy. Thus: 
 
  Int3:  If S accepts  a norm N of the relevant kind for act-type Φ, then whenever S 
  deliberates  about  whether  to  Φ,  S  will  be  significantly  motivated  by  N-directed 
  considerations. 
 
                                                 
27  Shah and Velleman's internalism is presumably connected to another element of their overall view, namely 
'norm expressivism'. This is the idea that “accepting a norm is a conative attitude that, among other things, 
disposes one to follow the norm and inhibits one from following any alternative” (Shah and Velleman 2005, 
p. 510). Parallel remarks apply here to those made in the text. A spelled out version of norm expressivism 
would have to say what the relevant disposition amounts to. If the disposition is said to be so strong that it 
gives rise to phenomena like exclusivity or transparency, then this will be an extremely implausible version 
of norm expressivism. Expressivists do not typically make such strong claims. 
28  The account of belief in Shah and Velleman (2005) is not purely normativist, but also contains a teleological 
element—the  view,  in  a  slogan,  is  that  belief  is  both  causally  and  normatively  governed  by  truth. The 
teleological element of this view may suffice to explain efficacity. So, even if normativism cannot explain 
efficacity, this is not itself an objection to Shah's overall view. However, it is important to investigate the 
explanatory power of normativism as such, since Shah's argument for his view depends crucially on this. 17 
By 'significantly motivated by N-directed considerations' I mean motivated enough to satisfy 
the condition of efficacy—that is, S will not intentionally violate N, nor conclude deliberation 
by doing something that she thinks as likely as not to violate  N. Note that Int3 does not 
merely attribute a general disposition to be motivated by norms that one accepts; it attributes 
specific significant motivation in any particular case to which the norm applies.
29 This is what 
is required if there is to be  any hope of explaining efficacy, since the idea of efficacy is not 
merely that we are generally disposed to be significantly motivated by evidence in our 
doxastic deliberation, but rather that we are so motivated in every instance of doxastic 
deliberation. 
If Int3 is true, then normativism seems to give a straightforward explanation of efficacy: the 
subject deliberating about whether to believe p ipso facto accepts the prescription to believe 
p only if p, thus by Int3 is significantly motivated to satisfy that norm and will not form a 
belief that she thinks as likely as not to be false. 
But at first glance Int3 looks as implausible as Int1 and Int2. It's not the case that we are 
invariably, in particular cases, significantly motivated by the relevant norms that we accept. 
On the contrary, we often intentionally violate norms that we accept. 
Consider  assertion.  Many  philosophers  hold  that  assertion  is  subject  to  one  or  more 
constitutive norms. Some of these philosophers hold that assertion is subject to a constitutive 
epistemic norm of knowledge: that is, it is constitutive of assertion that you ought to assert 
p only if you know p.
30 Another obvious possibility is that assertion is subject to a constitutive 
norm of truth: you ought to assert p only if p.
31 Supposing that some such view is true, it 
wouldn't follow that we cannot intentionally make assertions whose contents we don't know, 
or whose contents are false. If a view entailed such a thing, it would constitute a  reductio of 
                                                 
29  Contrast the internalist principle (2) given by Wedgwood (2007, 28). 
30  The most influential defence of this is Williamson (2000, Ch. 11). 
31  Versions of this view have recently been defended by Weiner (2005) and Whiting ( forthcoming). Note that 
the scope of the 'ought' is wide in each case. 18 
the view, because it is obvious that we can and do assert things that we don't know, and that 
we are fully aware we don't know, and things we don't believe, and things that we know are 
false.  What  such  a  view  of  assertion  entails  is  that  the  relevant  speech-acts  violate  the 
constitutive norm of assertion, not that they are impossible.
32 
Is the putative norm of assertion a norm of the 'relevant kind'? We can certainly imagine a 
view on which the norm of assertion is analogous to the putative truth norm of belief in salient 
respects.  It  is  a  prescription. We  can  su ppose  that  it  is  constitutive  of  the  concept  of 
assertion.
33 It is (we can suppose) a norm of correctness. None of that will make the norm any 
more inviolable, nor will it thereby make the view obviously false.
34 
The normativist might object that the norm of assertion is nonetheless not of the relevant kind 
because it is not 'heavy duty' enough. The norm of assertion is merely one norm among others 
that one typically takes into account when deliberating about what to assert. In a particular 
case one might conclude, because of considerations of politeness, prudence, or whatever, that 
what one all-things-considered ought to assert is something false, or something one doesn't 
know. By contrast, the normativist might say, the prescription to  believe p only if p is not 
merely a norm, among others, that one takes into account when deliberating about whether to 
believe  p.  Rather,  it  somehow  silences  or  defeats  any  norms  that  make  opposing 
recommendations, when it comes to the question what to believe—as moral norms have been 
claimed to do when it comes to the question how to act. That is, in accepting the prescription 
to believe only what is true, one accepts when deliberating about whether to believe p that 
                                                 
32  Steglich-Petersen (2006) makes this point about the speech-act of promising. This speech-act is plausibly 
constituted in part by a norm along the lines: you ought to (promise to Φ only if you intend to Φ). That the 
promising subject must regard herself as subject to this norm does not ensure that she will care about it in a 
particular case. Indeed, the promising subject might be quite aware that she has no intention of Φing. 
33  I do not know whether the knowledge norm of assertion, or the other norms that have been proposed (see, 
e.g., Brown 2008), are supposed to be constitutive of the  concept of assertion. But a view on which they are 
so constitutive is not obviously false. 
34  Of course, assertion, unlike belief, is an intentional action. So, even if we can intentionally violate the 
putative norm of assertion, arguably we cannot intentionally violate the norm of belief, if that means doing so 
by performing an intentional action. But that is beside the point. The point is that we seemingly cannot 
conclude deliberation about what to believe by forming a belief that we think will violate the putative norm 
of belief. 19 
what one all-things-considered ought to do, or what one 'just plain' ought to do, is believe p 
only if p.
35 
Int3 certainly appears more plausible if the 'relevant kind' of norm must have this status.
36 It's 
one thing to intentionally violate the rules of assertion because other considerations outweigh 
them; it's another thing to intentionally act contrary to what you take it you all -things-
considered ought not do. 
It is worth noting that this move requires the normativist to make a very strong claim: namely, 
that it is a conceptual truth that, for any  p, you all-things-considered or 'just plain' ought to 
believe p only if p. Thus, even if believing a falsehood would save the world from destruction, 
you nevertheless ought not believe it. Of course, if your evidence counts against it then you 
epistemically ought not believe it. But the claim to which the normativist is committed, if 
making this move, is that the norm of belief entails that you ought not believe it simpliciter. 
And this is a conceptual truth; anyone who denies it is confused about the concept of belief.
37 
Shah makes some remarks that suggest he might be happy to endorse this strong claim,
38 but 
many philosophers may find it hard to swallow that application of the concept of belief, or of 
any other concept that isn't a central normative concept like  good, reason or virtue, could 
involve such strong normative commitments.
39 
                                                 
35  As suggested in this sentence, there is more than one way in which this sort of idea could be filled out. One 
way is in terms of the notion of all-things-considered ought; on the need for such an idea, also referred to as 
ought tout court, sans phrase, all-out, or without qualification, see for example: Davidson (2001), Wedgwood 
(2007, 24-25), Alvarez (2010, 15-16). Another way to fill out the idea is in terms of the notion of 'just plain 
ought' (see Feldman 2000); here, the thought might be that, when it comes to belief, what you 'just plain' 
ought to do coincides with what you epistemically ought to do. A third way to fill out the idea would be to 
say that epistemic reasons silence other reasons when it comes to belief; on the notion of silencing, see 
McDowell (1978). In any case, the essential idea is that by accepting the norm of belief, you commit to a 
judgment to the effect that you ought not believe p if p is false, and this judgment has the same status as the 
sort of judgment about what you ought to do that can conclude practical deliberation and on which you base 
an intention to act. 
36  Not so for Int1 or Int2, however. My argument against them in sec. 3.1 is unaffected by whether the 'relevant 
kind' of norm is 'heavy duty' or not. 
37  Philosophers who deny it include Foley (1993), Papineau (1999) and Reisner (2009). 
38  See Shah (2003, pp. 454-5), where he claims that it is a conceptual truth that there are no pragmatic reasons 
for belief. 
39  The matter is complicated by the seeming fact that, if a proposition is  evidently false, you will normally not 
be able to do the following: believe it anyway, for the reason that doing so will save the world from 20 
In any case we can put this point aside, because Int3 is still false, even if we assume that the 
'relevant kind' of norm is 'heavy duty'—that it determines what you all-things-considered or 
'just plain' ought to do in any case of doxastic deliberation. This is shown by the possibility of 
akrasia—that is, intentionally acting contrary to your own judgment of what you all-things-
considered 'just plain' ought to do.
40 Akrasia is a familiar phenomenon; that it occurs, though 
puzzling, is undeniable. No matter how 'heavy duty' a norm, there is the possibility that a 
subject who accepts it akratically violates it. Take moral norms. If any norms are 'heavy duty', 
moral norms surely are. It is a truism  that we can intentionally violate moral norms that we 
accept. A zealous Kantian might accept a norm that forbids lying, or treating other persons as 
mere means; that won't make her incapable of intentionally lying or treating others as mere 
means. We all  regularly do things that we think we morally ought not do, out of laziness, 
weakness, indifference, selfishness, spite, or whatever. 
Regardless of the status of moral norms, there are many familiar cases of subjects who 
intentionally act contrary to their  judgment of what they all -things-considered 'just plain' 
ought to do. You intentionally stay under the warm blankets despite your firm judgment that 
what you ought to do is get up immediately and go to the office; you intentionally choose to 
have one last beer despite judging that you ought to go home instead. 
In sum, then, it looks implausible that  Int3 is true of any kind of norm. And it can hardly be 
claimed that the norm of belief has a special kind of motivational inescapability not possessed 
                                                                                                                                                         
destruction (that is, it seems that something like efficacy is indeed a feature of doxastic deliberation). Some 
form of 'ought implies can' principle may then be invoked, to argue that it is not the case that you ought to 
believe it. Now, this would not yet show that it is the case that you ought not believe it. But in any case, we 
can imagine a scenario in which you have some mechanism that can directly and instantaneously implant a 
given belief in your mind, and over whose operation you have voluntary control (see Bennett, 1991). Given 
that you would save the world by believing p, and you can come to believe p by operating this mechanism, is 
it nevertheless the case that you ought not believe p, and that you must accept this on pain of conceptual 
confusion? It might be said that, in such a scenario, although you ought to implant in yourself the belief that 
p, nevertheless you ought not believe p. I find it difficult to make sense of this proposal: how can you be 
required to do something that logically entails doing something you are required not to do? 
40 The normativist account of belief, combined with  Int3, would allow for the possibility of a certain kind of 
akratic belief—namely, that in which a belief contrary to the subject’s own evaluation of the evidence is held 
in place by mechanisms other than doxastic deliberation. What is ruled out by Int3 is akratically violating a 
norm you accept through deliberation in which that norm is applied. 21 
by  other  norms,  even  moral  norms.  That  would  be  implausible,  ad  hoc  and  devoid  of 
explanatory power. 
At this point it might be natural to wonder what exactly is meant, in Shah's account, by the 
notion of 'accepting' or 'applying' a norm. I have been construing this notion in such a way 
that it can roughly be assimilated to an implicit or explicit judgment about what one ought to 
do,  where  'ought'  expresses  a  prescription.  This,  I  have  argued,  leaves  a  gap  between 
acceptance of a norm and being significantly motivated to satisfy it. Am I being uncharitable 
when I construe Shah's claim in such a way that this gap is left?
41 
I don't see an alternative way of interpreting Shah's claim, that doesn't deprive the account of 
all explanatory power, or turn it into a  terminological variant on an account that Shah 
explicitly distinguishes as a rival to his own. 
One way to close the gap I have been focusing on would be to stipulate that the term 
'acceptance' is being used in such a way that acceptance of a norm  entails being significantly 
motivated to satisfy it. Then, the normativist account of belief would entail efficacy. But this 
would make the kind of norm-acceptance that is, according to normativism, constitutive of 
possession of the concept of belief, wholly mysterious. It would be a kind of explanatory 
virtus dormitiva. We can see this when we compare it with moral norms. Consider possession 
of the concept of something's being morally wrong. Possession of this concept just doesn't 
entail, in any particular case, that a subject will not (perhaps akratically) do what she thinks is 
wrong. 
Alternatively,  one  might  stipulate  that  'acceptance'  of  a  norm  just  is  being  significantly 
motivated to satisfy the norm. But now the normativist account collapses into the bare claim 
that efficacy is a condition on acceptance of the concept of belief. It's no longer clear in what 
sense  such  an  account  would  be  talking  about  norms;  and  in  any  case  it  is  no  more 
                                                 
41  Thanks to Tony Booth for raising this question. 22 
explanatory than the previous suggestion. 
A  third  way  to  close  the  gap  would  be  to  claim  that  the  subject  engaged  in  doxastic 
deliberation  must  be  aiming  to  satisfy  the  norm  of  belief.  I  already  discussed  a  similar 
suggestion  in  sec.  3.1  above;  as  we  saw,  it  simply  concedes  the  territory  to  the  rival 
teleological account, leaving normativism playing no role after all in the explanation of the 
role of truth in doxastic deliberation. 
If there is an alternative understanding of 'acceptance' of a norm, on which the normativist 
account can explain efficacy, then it seems to me that the burden is on the defender of the 
account to provide it. 
 
3.3 Efficacy as a Constraint on Rational Doxastic Deliberation 
Akrasia is a counterexample to Int3.While not impossible, akrasia is nonetheless irrational. 
This suggests that we might find a plausible internalist principle by limiting it to cases of 
rational conduct: 
 
  Int4: If S accepts a norm N of the relevant 'heavy duty' kind for act-type Φ, then 
  whenever S deliberates about whether to Φ, if S is rational she will be significantly 
  motivated by N-directed considerations. 
 
Given how I have defined 'heavy duty' and 'significantly motivated', and given that akrasia is 
indeed irrational, Int4 looks plausible.
42 
Normativism, when understood as claiming that the concept of belief involves a 'heavy duty'  
                                                 
42  Could this same move—restricting the relevant principles to rational conduct—be made in response to my 
case in sec. 3.1 against Int1 and Int2? No. Acceptance of a norm, 'heavy duty' or otherwise, enjoining you to 
Φ only if C obtains, does not make it irrational to Φ or not Φ for some reason irrelevant to whether C obtains.  
The Kantian who accepts a moral norm forbidding conduct that involves treating others as mere means to an 
end is not irrational when motivated to Φ by some consideration orthogonal to whether Φing would involve 
treating another as a mere means to an end. 23 
norm, and Int4, together seem to entail that rational doxastic deliberation will be characterised 
by efficacy. That is, it seems that they can explain why a subject who concludes doxastic 
deliberation  by  forming  a  belief  that,  by  her  own  lights,  the  evidence  counts  against,  is 
irrational. If my arguments to this point have been correct, this is the most that normativism 
can explain about doxastic deliberation. 
I take no position in this paper on whether normativism  should explain more than this.
43 
Rather, I want to point out that there are readily available alternative explanations of why 
rational doxastic deliberation will be characterised by efficacy. 
One explanation would appeal to the teleological account of belief, according to which it is in 
the nature of belief to be regulated by activities or processes that have as their aim or function 
that the beliefs thereby regulated be true. Doxastic deliberation about whether to believe p, on 
this view, is characterised by the aim of getting it right about the truth of p (otherwise what 
you’re regulating is not really belief). Considerations relevant to what to believe, as far as this 
aim goes, will be truth-directed considerations. But you can't rationally pursue an aim through 
a certain activity, unless you are guided, in your conduct of that activity, by considerations 
that you take to be relevant to how to achieve that aim. And you can't rationally pursue that 
aim if you conclude the activity by selecting a course of action that you think unlikely to 
satisfy the aim, foregoing another course of action that you think would be likely to satisfy 
it.
44 Thus, the subject who engages in doxastic deliberation will, if rational, be  significantly 
motivated by truth-directed considerations.
45 
                                                 
43  The answer to this question depends in part on whether a species of so-called 'epistemic akrasia' is impossible 
(in which case normativism would have more to explain) or merely irrational. The possibility of epistemic 
akrasia is accepted by Engel (2006), and denied by Adler (2002) and Owens (2002). 
44   If your evidence makes  p improbable, then believing p would be unlikely to satisfy the putative aim of 
getting it right about p, while disbelieving p would be likely to satisfy it. 
  There is a question of why, if the teleological account is true, you can’t rationally form the belief that p when 
your evidence is exactly evenly balanced. In such a case, believing p would seemingly be no less likely to 
satisfy the aim of getting it right about p than would disbelieving p. In fact, however, it depends on exactly 
what the putative aim amounts to. Different answers to this question are offered in McHugh (2011b) and in 
Whiting (2012). 
45  Arguably, pursuing an aim by taking a course of action you think  unlikely to achieve the aim , while 24 
A second approach, more deflationary in spirit, would be to say that epistemic rationality 
requires  doxastic  deliberation  to  exhibit  efficacy  (and  perhaps  even  weak  or  strong 
exclusivity). Epistemic rationality just is a kind of rationality that is directed towards truth in a 
certain way. Thus, failures of efficacy are always irrational in a certain respect, or from a 
certain point of view. This point of view matters to us because we are generally concerned 
about truth. That’s why we care about epistemic rationality, and tend to evaluate beliefs and 
doxastic activities from the epistemic point of view. But this concern for truth need not enter 
into an account of the nature of belief, according to this proposal—or at any rate, not in the 
way that the normativist proposes. Epistemic rationality need not derive from a constitutive 
prescriptive norm of belief.
46 
So, although normativism may be able to explain why rational doxastic deliberation is 
characterised by efficacity, this provides no basis for an inference to the best explanation in 
support of the view. 
 
4. Conclusion 
Shah's argument for normativism about belief is an inference to the best explanation from 
transparency,  which  is  claimed  to  be  a  feature  of  doxastic  deliberation.  I  have  argued, 
however, that normativism fails to explain transparency, as well as a range of weaker putative 
phenomena: strong exclusivity, weak exclusivity and efficacy. While normativism may be 
able to explain why rational doxastic deliberation is characterised by efficacy, this provides 
no  support  for  normativism  over  rival  views,  since  plausible  alternative  explanations  are 
available. The argument for normativism is therefore fatally undermined. 
This does not mean that it is not a conceptual truth that true belief is correct belief and false 
                                                                                                                                                         
foregoing  another  course  of  action  you  think  would  be  likely  to  satisfy  it,  is  incoherent  in  some  more 
profound way than the mere irrationality of akrasia—if not flat-out impossible. Thus, if epistemic akrasia is 
not just irrational, but more profoundly incoherent than that, this may be explained by the teleological view 
of belief. See McHugh (forthcoming b) for discussion of what a teleological view can explain. 
46   Something like this appears to be Papineau’s view (Papineau 1999, forthcoming). 25 
belief is incorrect belief. Rather, it means that we have little reason to view this standard of 
correctness as a prescriptive norm. 
Shah has provided a normativist account of intention that parallels his account of belief, and 
he offers an analogous inference to the best explanation to support it.
47 It seems to me that the 
points I have made in the present paper would apply,  mutatis mutandis, to that analogous 
argument.
48 
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